01892nam a2200325 a 4500 20181210070738.0 cr ||||||||||| 060823s2006 dcu sb i000 0 eng 2006618424 DLC DLC BD-DhBPA HG3881.5.W57 332.2 MIC 2006 Microfinance games / Xavier Gine ...[et al.]. Washington, D.C. : World Bank, 2006. 45 p. : ill. ; 23 cm. Policy research working paper ; 3959 Title from PDF file as viewed on 8/23/2006. Includes bibliographical references. "Microfinance has been heralded as an effective way to address imperfections in credit markets. But from a theoretical perspective, the success of microfinance contracts has puzzling elements. In particular, the group-based mechanisms often employed are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion, although they can also reduce moral hazard and improve selection. The authors created an experimental economics laboratory in a large urban market in Lima, Peru and over seven months conducted 11 different games that allow them to unpack microfinance mechanisms in a systematic way. They find that risk-taking broadly conforms to predicted patterns, but that behavior is safer than optimal. The results help to explain why pioneering microfinance institutions have been moving away from group-based contracts. "--World Bank web site. Also available in print. System requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader. Mode of access: World Wide Web. Zahid Microfinance Peru Lima. 14911 Game theory. 108002 Gine, Xavier. 107812 World Bank. 108003 Policy research working papers (Online) ; 3959. 108004 ddc BK 37557 37557 0 ddc 0 0 BPATC BPATC GRR 2018-05-13 0 332.2 MIC 2006 WB5493 2018-05-13 00:00:00 2018-12-10 BK Zahid