000			01892nam a2200325 a 4500
005			20181210070738.0
007			cr |||||||||||
008			060823s2006 dcu sb i000 0 eng
010			_a 2006618424
040			_aDLC _cDLC _dBD-DhBPA
050	0	0	_aHG3881.5.W57
082			_a332.2 _bMIC 2006
245	0	0	_aMicrofinance games / _cXavier Gine ...[et al.].
260			_aWashington, D.C. : _bWorld Bank, _c2006.
300			_a45 p. : _bill. ; _c23 cm.
490	1		_aPolicy research working paper ; _v3959
500			_aTitle from PDF file as viewed on 8/23/2006.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references.
520	3		_a"Microfinance has been heralded as an effective way to address imperfections in credit markets. But from a theoretical perspective, the success of microfinance contracts has puzzling elements. In particular, the group-based mechanisms often employed are vulnerable to free-riding and collusion, although they can also reduce moral hazard and improve selection. The authors created an experimental economics laboratory in a large urban market in Lima, Peru and over seven months conducted 11 different games that allow them to unpack microfinance mechanisms in a systematic way. They find that risk-taking broadly conforms to predicted patterns, but that behavior is safer than optimal. The results help to explain why pioneering microfinance institutions have been moving away from group-based contracts. "--World Bank web site.
530			_aAlso available in print.
538			_aSystem requirements: Adobe Acrobat Reader.
538			_aMode of access: World Wide Web.
590			_aZahid
650		0	_aMicrofinance _zPeru _zLima. _914911
650		0	_aGame theory. _9108002
700	1		_aGine, Xavier. _9107812
710	2		_aWorld Bank. _9108003
830		0	_aPolicy research working papers (Online) ; _v3959. _9108004
942			_2ddc _cBK
999			_c37557 _d37557